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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature by conducting the first empirical 
investigation into the determinants of prosocial behaviour in the Palestinian 
territories, with a focus on the role of trust and institutions. Drawing on a 
unique dataset collected through the administration of a questionnaire to a 
representative sample of the population of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, we have found that institutional trust is the strongest predictor of 
prosociality. This result suggests that, in collectivist societies with low 
levels of generalized trust, the lack of citizens’ confidence in the fairness 
and efficiency of public institutions may compromise social order. The 
strengthening of institutional trust may also reinforce prosocial behaviour in 
individualist societies, where a decline in generalized trust has been 
documented by empirical studies 
Keywords: Institutional trust, generalized trust, prosocial behaviour, social 
capital, institutions, Palestine. 
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1. Introduction 
Weak public institutions discourage mutual confidence and prosocial behaviour in prisoner’s’ 
dilemma-like situations (Rothstein 1998; 2003; Dasgupta 2005; 2013; Letki 2006; Frey and 
Torgler 2007; Bühlmann and Freitag 2009). The empirical literature identifies the belief that 
unknown others can be trusted (usually called “social”, “generalized” or “moral” trust) as 
being  one of the best predictors of prosocial behaviour, especially in “individualist” societies 
– i.e. those societies where social relations mainly rely on weak ties and are informed by 
values related to power, achievement, and self-direction (Hofstede 1991; Oishi et al. 1998; 
Irwin 2009). In “collectivist” societies, where social relations rely on strong, cohesive group 
ties informed by principles of tradition, conformity, and benevolence (Hofstede 1991; 
Triandis 1995), confidence in public institutions has been found to play a stronger role in 
promoting cooperation (Yamaghishi 1988; Kumlin 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005). In 
these societies, citizens tend neither to trust nor to cooperate with people outside of their 
reference groups – usually only composed of the extended family and close friends. 
Institutional trust can provide individuals with valid incentives to behave prosocially – e.g. to 
avoid cheating in transactions –  even in settings of low or decreasing generalized trust, for 
example by strengthening the belief that anti-social behaviours will be properly punished.  
This paper aims to empirically investigate the determinants of prosocial behaviour in the 
Palestinian Territories, with a special focus on the role of different types of trust. To reach 
this goal, we rely on a unique dataset collected through the administration of a questionnaire 
to a representative sample of 2508 Palestinian households in the West Bank (including 
Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip in June and July 2007 by the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics.  
The Palestinian Territories are characterized by a typical collectivist society coping with a 
difficult process of state capacity building in a context of low generalized trust and strong 
uncertainty about the future: Israeli closure policy has compromised Palestinian workers’ 
ability to work in Israel and causes continuous fluctuations in prices and transaction costs, 
leading to a substantial inability to undertake basic economic activities (European 
Commission 2004; 2011). As a result, in addition to dramatic macroeconomic implications in 
terms of labour force participation, unemployment, standards of living, poverty, and 
deterioration of human capital, the social mechanisms for the efficient resolution of 
prisoner’s’ dilemma-like situations are weak, agents’ behaviour in strategic contexts is hardly 
predictable, and economic transactions between unknown parties take place in a climate of 
4 
 
general distrust. The uncertainty pervading the economic environment is a decisive factor of 
the economic backwardness which further hampers the process of state capacity building. On 
the other hand, Palestinian society seems to remain relatively cohesive. As stated in a World 
Bank report, “Despite violence, economic hardship and the daily frustrations of living under 
curfew and closure, lending and sharing are widespread and families for the most part remain 
functional … The West Bank and Gaza has/have absorbed levels of unemployment that 
would have torn the social fabric in many other societies.” (World Bank 2003, p. 6). 
The collectivist aspects of Palestinian society – such as strong family ties and informal 
networks, commonly known as “bonding social capital” (Putnam et al. 1993) – play a crucial 
role in building resilience to conflict (World Bank 2003; Nasr and Hilal 2007). However, 
bonding social capital also prevents group members from trusting (and cooperating with) 
outsiders (Putnam et al. 1993; Field 2004; Sabatini 2008). In addition to the achievement of 
peace, the promotion of prosocial behaviour outside of the small boundaries of reference 
groups is a necessary (though not sufficient) task for the advancement of the economic, 
social, and political development of the Territories. 
In this paper we investigate the possible role of trust in prosocial behaviour in two steps: first, 
we draw on a number of attitudinal items to build indicators of unobserved attitudes such as 
institutional trust and prosociality through a measurement model. Second, the correlation 
between latent measures of trust and prosocial attitudes is assessed through a structural 
equations model (SEM) and some refinements.  
SEM estimates indicate a significant and positive correlation between trust in domestic 
institutions, such as public institutions, clans and the rule of law, and prosocial attitudes. 
Trust in international institutions seems to play a minor role in prosociality. Trust in public 
institutions can be understood as a consequence of citizens’ perception about the fairness and 
efficiency of these institutions. We borrow the concept of “psychological contract” from the 
organizational behaviour literature (Rousseau 1989; 1995) to argue that there is an implicit 
agreement between citizens and institutions based on mutual obligations. Our results suggest 
that citizens who perceive institutions as efficient and fair want to act prosocially to “fulfil 
the contract”. If institutions are perceived as inefficient and corrupt, institutional trust 
decreases and prosocial behaviour is discouraged, because citizens neither want to respect 
obligations (e.g. in paying taxes) nor do they fear being sanctioned for their anti-social 
behaviour (e.g. inefficient public institutions will find it difficult to properly punish tax 
evasion).  
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In a collectivist society endemically lacking generalized trust, a decrease in institutional trust 
may compromise social order, especially in the course of a difficult process of state capacity 
building. The strengthening of institutional trust may also reinforce the “psychological 
contract” between the state and its citizens in Western democracies, ?or more? in general in 
individualist societies, where a decline in generalized trust has been documented by empirical 
studies (Putnam 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Sarracino 2010; Bartolini et al. 2013). Political 
science studies have highlighted how inclusive and efficient welfare state institutions tend to 
increase social and institutional trust (Rothstein 2001; van Oorschot 2004 Kumlin and 
Rothstein 2005; Bühlmann and Freitag 2009; Jensen and Svendsen 2011). Our findings add 
to this literature by suggesting that governments, by designing efficient and fair state 
institutions, can invest in social and institutional trust and encourage prosocial behaviour.   
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the motivation of the study and 
briefly reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes our data and reports some 
descriptive statistics. The empirical analysis of the role of different types of trust in prosocial 
attitudes is presented and discussed in section 4, along with some model refinements. 
Concluding remarks and a brief discussion of implications for policy and future research 
close the paper. 
 
2. Motivation of the study and related literature 
Since the early 1990s, a growing number of studies has identified social capital – with 
particular regard to its “cognitive” dimension of social trust and its “structural” aspect of 
prosocial behaviour
4
 – as a factor of economic and social development. Trust and prosocial 
behaviour have been credited with reducing reduce transaction costs, promoting  the 
enforcement of contracts, facilitating credit at the level of individual investors, and to 
encouraging innovation and investment in human and physical capital (see among others 
Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Christoforou 2010; Zak and Knack 
2001).  
                                                          
4
 Following Uphoff (1999), it is possible to distinguish between structural and cognitive dimensions of social 
capital. Structural social capital deals with individuals’ behaviours and mainly takes the form of networks and 
associations which can be observed and measured through surveys. Cognitive social capital derives from 
individuals’ perceptions resulting in norms, values and beliefs that contribute to cooperation. These latter 
aspects involve subjective evaluations of the social environment. Both structural and cognitive dimensions 
include several sub-dimensions whose relationship with health variables in turn varies depending on the context 
and on the effect of other individual and local potentially influential factors (Degli Antoni 2009; Yamamura 
2011). 
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Knack argues that (2002), “Where social mechanisms for the efficient resolution of prisoners’ 
dilemma and principal-agent games are weak or absent (i.e. where most potential pairs of 
economic transactors cannot trust each other) the private returns to predation increase while 
the private returns to production fall” (p. 171). Individuals in higher-trust societies indeed 
spend less on protecting themselves from being exploited in economic transactions (Knack 
and Keefer 1997). 
Even if these views have been acknowledged in the economics debate only recently, it is 
worth noting that the concept of the social “embeddedness” of the economic action is deeply 
rooted in the history of economic thought, and can also be found in the early work of the 
classical economists. Typical code-words of social capital literature (e.g. trust, altruism, 
sympathy, and prosocial behaviour) can be found in the work of Adam Smith. In the Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, Smith (1759) argued that there were certain virtues, such as trust and a 
concern for fairness that, due to their role in prosocial behaviour and in the discouragement of 
cheating, were vital for the functioning of a market economy. Smith described trust and 
prosocial behaviour as critical foundations of the early beginnings of the market, allowing the 
development of trade and economic activities. According to North (1990, p. 54) “the inability 
of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important 
source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third 
World”. In our view, it is reasonable to extend this point by arguing that not only the 
effective functioning of markets but also, to a larger extent, the resilience of the economic 
system, rely on those institutions (whether formal or informal) that foster the sharing and 
diffusion of feelings of trust and promote or preserve prosocial behaviour.  
Disentangling the determinants of prosocial behaviour, and its relationship with trust, is a 
fundamental task for economic research, which assumes particular importance in the analysis 
of a process of state capacity building, where markets and formal public institutions are in the 
early stages of their development. From this point of view, the Palestinian society poses a 
puzzle because, despite a very low generalized trust, forms of prosocial behaviour remain 
fully functional, helping to preserve social cohesion in a strongly unfavourable 
macroeconomic and political scenario.  
Irwin (2009) argues that, in collectivist societies, prosocial behaviour is affected by 
institutional trust (intended as the belief that institutions effectively induce others to act in a 
trustworthy manner) rather than generalized trust as in individualist cultures (Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi 1994; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Stolle 2001; Uslaner 2002).  
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In collectivist cultures relationships are guided by rigid distinctions between in-group and 
out-group. Individuals are tightly linked to their group, which protects them throughout their 
life span in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. People are expected to maintain harmony 
with the in-group through reciprocally cooperative interactions. To accomplish this, 
collectivism generally entails a strong emotional dependence on the group, which controls 
individual behaviour through social patterns and rules based on principles of tradition, 
conformity, benevolence and respect (Triandis, 1995; Irwin 2009; Berigan et al. 2011). 
Personal aspirations are often sacrificed to the pursuit of the group’s welfare (Hofstede, 1991; 
Berigan et al. 2011). Collectivist societies are naturally based on extended families or clans. 
Researchers typically agree that Western cultures are individualistic while Asian, Latin 
American and Middle Eastern cultures are collectivistic (Hofstede, 1991; Buda 1998). 
Yamighishi et al. (1994; 1998) find that, due to the importance individuals place on in-groups 
compared to out-groups, people from collectivist societies display markedly less trust in 
strangers than those from individualist societies (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Still 
Yamighishi (1988) shows that this lack of trust has a negative effect on prosocial behavior 
toward strangers. 
Irwin (2009) uses World Values Survey (WVS) microdata from 14 countries for the period 
1981-2001 to assess the role of social and institutional trust in prosocial behaviour. To test his 
hypotheses on the diverse roles of different types of trust, the author segments countries 
according to their respective levels of individualism or collectivism, as measured by the 
Hofstede-scale (Hofstede 1991) The empirical results suggest that individuals of collectivist 
societies rely mainly on public institutions to protect them from potential non-cooperative 
behaviours of out-group strangers. The effectiveness and fairness of public institutions in fact 
increase individuals’ confidence that cheating will be unfailingly punished and that unknown 
others will behave cooperatively.  
Institutional trust can be seen as the outcome of a complex, long-running and continuous 
interaction between the state and its citizens. This interaction is more likely to be cooperative 
in the presence of a certain degree of reciprocity between the parties: individuals trust 
institutions and avoid cheating only if they expect these institutions will act fairly and 
effectively.  
The literature explains this mechanism through two main arguments.  
The first argument, advanced by Kumlin and Rothstein (2005), stresses the idea that the 
positive perception that people have of public institutions increases people’s confidence in 
the society and their trust in their fellow citizens. Drawing on cross-sectional data collected in 
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1999 in Western Sweden by the SOM Institute at Göteborg University, the authors found that 
social trust is higher among people with more confidence in public officials and the welfare 
state’s institutions. 
The second argument focuses on the idea that trustworthy institutions may reinforce prosocial 
behaviour by increasing citizens’ confidence that cheating actions will be discovered and 
effectively punished (Irwin 2009).  
Several empirical studies have found a significant and positive correlation between the belief 
that strangers can be trusted and institutional trust – intended as trust in public institutions. It 
seems reasonable to argue that citizens who report high levels of confidence in public 
institutions may also be more confident that wrongdoers will be punished.  
The arguments outlined above lead us to formulate the hypothesis that, in the collectivist 
society of Palestinian territories, institutional trust – defined as confidence in public 
institutions – may be a better predictor of prosocial behaviour than other forms of trust. 
 
3. Data and methods 
As anticipated in the introduction, data were collected through the administration of a 
questionnaire to a representative sample of the population (n = 2508) of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip in June and July 2007 by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. The 
questionnaire was specifically designed to assess civic and political participation, 
engagement in formal and informal networks, various forms of trust, shared values, and 
attitudes on contemporary social and political issues
5
 (Nasr and Hilal 2007).   
Following SEM practice, we first drew on a number of attitudinal items to build three latent 
constructs: prosocial behaviour, trust in political institutions, and trust in civil institutions. 
The correlation between these constructs was then analyzed through a structural model, also 
accounting for a number of control variables.  
Prosocial behaviour (labelled as prosocial) is obtained as a combination of responses to 
questions about whether each of the following behaviours “can always be justified, never be 
justified or something in between”: 
- Absence from work without good reasons (work)  
- Bribery (bribe). 
                                                          
5
 As pointed out by Nasr and Hilal “Differently from the West Bank the analysis of data from the Gaza Strip 
could only be conducted at the level of the Strip’s population as a whole, since the political and security 
situation prevented from stratifying the sample at the more detailed level of sub-groups defined by demographic 
characteristics” (Nasr and Hilal 2007, p.2).  
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- Abstention in elections6 (abstention). 
- No commitment to traffic rules (traffic). 
- Purchase of stolen goods (stolen). 
Respondents chose a number from 1 (never justifiable) to 3 (always justifiable). We reversed 
this scale, so that larger values indicate a greater propensity for prosocial behavior. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
 n. obs. mean Std. Dev. min max Range 
work 1098 2.69 .579 1 3 2 
bribe 1098 2.95 .248 1 3 2 
abstention 1098 2.30 .737 1 3 2 
traffic 1098 2.84 .406 1 3 2 
stolen 1098 2.87 .394 1 3 2 
trust_gov 1098 2.06 1.008 1 4 3 
trust_parties 1098 2.08 .935 1 4 3 
trust_localgov 1098 2.49 .926 1 4 3 
trust_parliament 1098 2.21 .996 1 4 3 
trust_president 1098 2.28 1.014 1 4 3 
trust_judicial 1098 2.43 .978 1 4 3 
trust_police 1098 2.52 .968 1 4 3 
trust_un 1098 2.29 1.035 1 4 3 
trust_intorganisation 1098 2.17 .987 1 4 3 
trust_donors 1098 2.23 1.067 1 4 3 
trust_clan 1098 3.22 .751 1 4 3 
trust_specific 1098 6.24 1.193 2 8 6 
rule_law 1098 2.92 .313 1 3 2 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 This refers to the abstention at in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (Nasr and Hilal 
2007). The 2006 elections were the second parliamentary elections after those in 1996. The 2006 PLC elections 
were preceded by the Presidential elections in January 2005. 
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Due to the large sample size and to non-normal distributed data, in order to achieve a better 
empirical fit we employed a measurement model based on generalized least square (see 
Olsson et al. 2000). Figure 1 describes the measurement model used to construct the latent 
indicator of prosocial attitudes 
 
Figure 1: Measurement Model of Prosocial  
 
  
We obtained an unobserved factor which is significantly and positively correlated with all the 
observed indicators. The correlation matrix and regression weights are reported in Tables A1 
and A2 in the Appendix. Squared multiple correlations (reported in Table A3 in the 
Appendix) indicate that the unobserved factor explains more than 30% of the variance of 
work and stolen, and about 20% of the remaining items bribe and abstention.  
Due to the large sample size, the model chi-square is not a reliable goodness-of-fit measure 
(Bollen 1989; Kline 2005), we therefore followed Tempelaar et al. (2007) and rely on 
alternative fit indexes which are reported in Table A4 in the Appendix. All relative fit 
indicators are above the minimum threshold and all absolute fit indicators are below the value 
of the threshold level identified by the literature (Bollen 1989; Kline 2005).  
Institutional trust is measured by two latent variables obtained as combinations of indicators 
of respondents’ trust in public and international institutions. In the questionnaire, trust in 
public institutions is measured by the score from 1 to 4 given by respondents to the question: 
“Do you think that the following institutions can be trusted?”, 1 meaning ‘Totally’ and 4 
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meaning ‘Not at all’. The named institutions were the government
7
 (trust_gov), political 
parties (trust_parties), the local government (trust_localgov), the president of the Palestinian 
National Authority
8
 (trust_president), the Parliament (trust_parliament), the judicial system 
(trust_judicial) and the police (trust_police).  
On the other hand, trust in international institutions refers to international donors 
(trust_donors), international organizations linked to the United Nations (UN) (trust_un), and 
international organizations not linked to the UN (trust_intorganizations). We reversed the 
original scale, so that larger values indicate greater trust.  
 
Figure 2 describes the measurement model we used to build the latent indicators of trust in 
public and international institutions.  
Figure 2: Measurement Model Trust  
 
 
 
 Similarly with the measurement model of prosocial, here the latent variables of trust in 
public and international institutions are related to their respective multiple observable 
indicators.  
                                                          
7
 The term government mentioned in the questionnaire refers to the Palestinian Authority 
8
 This is the highest institutional position. The constitution requires the President is legitimated to appoint the 
Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. Among his/her responsibilities, the President is the chief of the 
Palestinian forces.   
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Correlation matrices, regression weights, and goodness-of-fit indexes are reported in Tables 
A5, A6, and A7 in the Appendix. 
Table A6 indicates that the regression weights between the latent variables and the 
observable items are all positive and significant at 1% significance level. The standardised 
regression weights of the latent indicator of trust in international institutions on the trust 
items reported in table A9 are largely above 0.7. This means that a 1 unit increase in the 
standard deviation of the latent variable is associated with an increase of more than 0.7 unit 
of standard deviation of the trust items. The standardised regression weights of the variable 
trust in public institutions on the trust items reported in table A9 are largely above 0.5 except 
in the case of trust in government where the standardised regression weight is 0.47. 
The covariance between the latent variables is significant at 1% significance level. The 
squared multiple correlations (reported in Table A8) indicate that the latent indicator of trust 
in international institutions explains approximately 67% of the variance of trust in donors in 
the UN and about approximately 75% of the variance of respondents’ trust in non-UN 
international organizations. The latent indicator of trust in public institutions explains a 
proportion ranging from 21% to 59% of the variance of basic indicators of institutional trust. 
We also control for knowledge-based trust, trust in clans, and the importance attributed to the 
rule of law. The social psychology literature identifies two main types of trust, “social” (or 
“generalized” or “moral”) trust, and “knowledge-based” (or “particularized”) trust (see 
Uslaner, 2002, for a comprehensive review). Unfortunately, we were not able to include 
generalized trust in the model, since this variable was measured by the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics as a binary indicator obtained by “yes” or “no” responses to the question: 
“Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted?”
9
.  
Generalized trust is distinct from knowledge-based trust, which depends on information and 
experience (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). According to Dasgupta (2000), we trust 
people mainly when we know something about their disposition, their available options, their 
ability and so forth, so we think they are trustworthy and expect they will choose to behave 
themselves. Knowledge-based trust is the confidence in known people and in people holding 
a similar status, such as relatives, friends, and colleagues. This form of trust is rooted in 
                                                          
9
 The use of binary variables may produce unreliable estimates in SEMs (Kline 2005). It is worth noting that 
measures of generalized trust based on this question has been criticized in the literature due to their ambiguity 
with respect to which “people” respondents have in mind. As stated by Knack and Keefer (1997), responses 
could easily reflect a varying mix of two concepts across individuals: how much trust one places in people who 
are not close friends or relatives, and the frequency of encounters with such persons. People in low-trust 
environments such as the Palestinian territories will transact more with close friends and relatives than with 
strangers, compared with people in high-trust environments such as most individualist societies. 
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strong ties, such as those embedded in Palestinian family clans, or may develop over time 
with business exchange (Zucker 1986, Ring and Van de Ven 1992) and plays a fundamental 
role in preserving economic activities, especially in the context of small communities such as 
Palestinian clans.  
Knowledge-based trust (trust_specific) is measured by the score from 1 to 4 given by 
respondents to the questions: “Do you think that your neigbours can be trusted?” and “Do 
you think that your colleagues can be trusted?”, 1 meaning ‘Totally’ and 4 meaning ‘Not at 
all’. As for previous indicators, we reversed the scale, so that larger values indicate greater 
trust. Our indicator is built as the arithmetical sum of the two scores. Trust in clans 
(trust_clan) is measured by the 1-4 score (recoded as for previous variables) given to the 
question “How much confidence do you have in the family clan?”. 
The importance of the rule of law (rule_law) is measured by the 1-4 score (as in the previous 
variables) given to the question “Which is the importance is the rule of law?” 
The relationships between prosocial behaviour and the various forms of trust are assessed by 
means of a structural equations model (SEM) and some refinements. The advantage of SEM 
over separate regression models for each outcome is twofold. First, as noted by Kupek 
(2006), “SEM can model all regression equations simultaneously, thus providing a flexible 
framework for testing a range of possible relationships between the variables in the model, 
including mediating effects and possible latent confounding variables. Second, on a more 
general level, SEM parameters can quantify the contribution of each predictor to the 
covariance structure such as the common factors model” (p. 8). Moreover, SEM allows the 
researcher to better account for possible causes of common bias affecting the main variables 
of the analysis by the estimation of possible correlations among error terms.  
We follow the conventional practice of indicating endogenous variables with   and 
exogenous variables with  . Error terms are indicated with the symbol  . The prosocial 
attitudes of individual j can be expressed as: 
 
jjjj      (1) 
 
where α is an intercept vector, B a matrix of structural parameters governing the relations 
among the endogenous variables, Γ a regression parameter matrix for regressions of 
endogenous variables on exogenous explanatory variables and j  a vector of disturbances. 
More specifically, in the model presented in this section, we only estimate a limited number 
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of parameters as reported in Table 1 below
10
. Modification indexes were used to add or 
subtract parameters one at time in order to achieve a better fit to the data. The path diagram 
of the model presented in this section is represented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 Structural Model  
 
 
 
  
4. Empirical results 
Before illustrating the SEM results, it is interesting to report some descriptive evidence. 
Table 2 ranks institutions based on the percentage of citizens reporting the highest trust score. 
12.34% of our sample report having great trust in the police while only 3.89% of respondents 
report great confidence in political parties. 
                                                          
10
 While designing the structural model, the researcher puts forward a number of hypotheses on the linkages 
connecting the phenomena under consideration. The consistency of these hypotheses with the pattern of 
variances and covariances in the data is then assessed through the goodness-of-fit tests. In practice, this 
approach combines exploratory and confirmatory purposes: first, a model is theorized and tested using SEM 
procedures. If it is found to be deficient, an alternative model is then tested based on changes suggested by 
modification indexes. Changes may consist, for example, in the addition of parameters to (or the subtraction 
from) matrixes Β and Γ. 
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Table 2: ranking of the Institutions according to trust  
Ranking Institutions % of respondents having 
great trust in this institution 
1 Family clan 40.32% 
2 Police 12.34% 
3 Judicial system 11.75% 
4 Local government 11.01% 
5 President 10.60% 
6 Parliament 8.68% 
7 Government 7.98% 
8 Political parties 3.89% 
 
  
 
Family clans appear to be more popular than formal political institutions. 40.32% of 
Palestinians in our sample declare they have total trust in family clans. The highest level of 
trust in clans is more frequently observed among males (42.91%) than females (37.73%). The 
analysis of correlations indicates that trust in clans is significantly and positively correlated 
with the age of the respondents  
Table 3 reports results of chi square tests between trust in different institutions, gender and 
active political participation. Compared to males, a smaller proportion of females report the 
highest level of confidence in the institutions representing the entire Territories such as the 
Parliament, the Government and the President, compared with male respondents. However, it 
also shows a smaller proportion of females do not trust these institutions at all. 
Tests also indicate a systematic and significant association between trust in institutions and 
political participation. The proportion of those who totally trust institutions is higher among 
the politically active.  
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Table 3 Trust in political institutions by gender and political participation   
Trust 
Institutions/characteristics  
Gender Individuals politically active  
Trust a lot police Female: 10.71%*** 
Male: 13.91%*** 
Active: 16.25%*** 
Not active: 10.74*** 
Not trust police Female: 23.88%*** 
Male: 26.81%*** 
 
Active: 23.93*** 
Not active: 26.06*** 
Trust a lot judicial  system Female: 10.99%*** 
Male: 12.48%*** 
Active: 16.44%*** 
Not active: 9.78%*** 
Not trust judicial system Female: 22.43%*** 
Male: 29.73%*** 
 
Active: 25.04%*** 
Not active: 26.71%*** 
Trust a lot local government Female: 12.03% 
Male: 10.07% 
Active: 11.40%*** 
Not active: 10.89%*** 
Not trust local government Female: 20.81%  
Male: 24.08% 
 
Active: 18.71%*** 
Not active: 24.16%*** 
Trust a lot President Female: 8.73%*** 
Male: 12.33%*** 
Active: 15.09%*** 
Not active: 8.64%*** 
Not trust President Female: 30.00%*** 
Male: 38.25%*** 
 
Active: 31.07%*** 
Not active: 35.68%*** 
Trust a lot Parliament Female: 7.73%*** 
Male: 9.56%*** 
Active: 9.88%*** 
Not active: 8.09%*** 
Not trust Parliament Female: 29.66%***  
Male: 37.74%*** 
 
Active: 36.14%* 
Not active: 32.96%* 
Trust a lot Government Female: 6.84%*** 
Male: 9.04%*** 
Active: 8.64%* 
Not active: 7.61%* 
Not trust Government Female: 39.6%*** 
Male: 44.27%*** 
 
Active: 45.45%* 
Not active: 40.72%* 
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Trust a lot political parties Female: 3.16% 
Male: 4.56% 
Active: 6.94%*** 
Not active: 2.51%*** 
Not trust political parties Female: 39.69% 
Male: 40.55 
Active: 35.60%*** 
Not active: 42.18%*** 
 
*, **, *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% significance level of the Chi-squared test 
 
 
A statistical analysis conducted through chi-squared estimations indicates that Palestinians 
appear to be reluctant toward the “heaviest anti-social behaviours such as bribery and the 
purchase of stolen goods. In fact, about 90% of the sample (90.67% female 88.17% males) do 
not accept the purchase of stolen goods and approximately 96% do not accept  bribery. 
Females are slightly more reluctant in justifying more to accept mild forms of anti-social 
behaviours than men: 78.26% of women do not accept absence from work without good 
reasons compared with 76.18% of men, and 87.45% of women do not agree with) the lack of 
commitment to traffic regulations against 82.95% of men. Palestinians seem to be more 
tolerant towards abstention at elections, which is frowned upon by 48.6% of females and 
48.25% of males. This proportion is slightly lower, 46.79%, among Palestinians with a higher 
level of education. 
The SEM analysis shows that our latent measure of prosocial attitudes is significantly and 
positively correlated with institutional trust, with trust in clans and with the importance 
attributed to the rule of law (see Table 4). . Goodness-of-fit indicators are reported in table 5. 
All the indicators of fit satisfy the respective threshold minimum and maximum limits.  
The correlation between the main endogenous variable and our measure of knowledge-based 
trust is only slightly significant  
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 Table 4 GLS estimates of the Structural Equation Model  
 prosocial Trust Public. 
Inst. 
Trust Intern. 
Inst. 
Rule of law Trust 
Specific 
 
Trust Public 
Inst. 
 
.059** 
(.029) 
    
 
Trust Intern. 
Inst. 
 
.018 
(.017) 
    
 
Trust Clan 
 
.021 
(.018) 
 
.175*** 
(.026) 
 
.125*** 
(.038) 
 
.020 
(.013) 
 
.663*** 
(.044) 
 
Rule of law 
 
.095** 
(.040) 
    
 
Trust 
Specific 
 
.023* 
(.012) 
    
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parenthesis (sample size: 1098 
observations) 
 
 
Table 5 Measures of Fit 
Indicators CMIN/DF RMSEA SRMR GFI AGFI IFI CFI 
Cut-off 
value 
 
<5 
 
 
<0.08 
 
<0.1 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
Level of 
this 
analysis 
 
 
2.23 
 
0.033 
 
0.039 
 
0.97 
 
0.96 
 
0.91 
 
0.90 
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This result provides support to the hypothesis that, in collectivist societies, institutional trust 
plays a greater role than knowledge-based trust in providing incentives to avoid cheating and 
to behave prosocially. Knowledge-based trust, in fact, depends on experience and is strictly 
related to individuals’ involvement in small networks – such as family clans – acting as forms 
of “bonding social capital” and encouraging members to behave cooperatively with their in-
group peers and to distrust (and possibly exploit) outsiders. Institutional trust, on the other 
hand, can provide incentives to prosocial behaviour through two main channels.  
Firstly, individuals will be less fearful of being cheated in interactions, especially 
transactions, if they are confident that institutions are capable of enforcing contracts, 
effectively resolving disputes, and possibly punishing offenders. This makes outsiders’ 
behaviour more predictable causing an overall reduction in uncertainty, at least in the 
perception of those who trust institutions, who are thereby encouraged to act cooperatively. 
Secondly, the cooperative behaviour of individuals who trust institutions may be a matter of 
reciprocity. As outlined in the brief review in Section 2, several studies show that citizens 
tend to act prosocially if they feel they are being fairly treated by public institutions.  
In addition to these two explanations, citizens may also act prosocially because they are tied 
to public institutions by a “psychological contract” based on mutual obligations. People who 
think that institutions are efficient and fair are likely to report high levels of institutional trust 
and may choose prosocial behaviour with the aim of fulfilling the psychological contract.  
The concept of psychological contract refers to the mutual beliefs, perceptions, and informal 
obligations between an employer and an employee (Rousseau 1989; 2004). It is a common 
view in the organizational behaviour literature that employees tend to maximize their efforts 
and to behave cooperatively only as far as their expectations of their employer’s fairness are 
fulfilled (Robinson and Rousseau 1994; Aselage et al. 2003). The notion of psychological 
contract can be extended to other principal-agent-like scenarios. Feld and Frey (2002) argue 
that the relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers involves an implicit or 
psychological contract. “The more strongly the political participation rights are developed, 
the more important this contract is, and the higher tax morale is. The existence and survival 
of this tax contract requires certain behaviour on the part of the two parties concerned”. This 
argument also relies on the concept of procedural justice: according to the authors, “The tax 
authorities must acknowledge and support the contract with the taxpayers by acting in a 
respectful way towards them, but also by preventing honest taxpayers from being exploited in 
the process.” (Feld and Frey 2002, p. 89). A number of subsequent empirical studies on tax 
morale report a positive impact in institutional trust on tax compliance across different 
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contexts, such as Latin America (Torgler 2005a), Switzerland (Torgler 2005b), and Europe 
(Lago Penas et al 2010). In these cases, institutional trust refers to formal public 
organizations including confidence in government (Torgler 2004; Torgler and Schneider 
2007), in the president (Torgler 2005a; 2005b), in the Parliament (Martinez-Vasquez and 
Torgler 2009) and in the legal system (Torgler and Schneider 2007).  
Whether the relationship involves an employer and his/her employees or the state and its 
citizens, the social exchange between the parties and the fulfilment of the contract essentially 
rely on trust. Our results support the view that, in collectivist societies, trust towards domestic 
political institutions plays a greater role than other forms of trust. 
In the Palestinian territories, in addition to formal public institutions, clans and international 
institutions should also be considered. International NGOs play a crucial role in the 
Palestinian economy. As reported by Lasensky (2004), Palestinians are probably the largest 
per capita recipients of international aid. Donors and international organisations provide 
fundamental support in the provision of important public services such as education and food 
security.  
Our estimates, however, interestingly do not show a significant role of trust in international 
institutions in prosociality. Trust in clans, on the other hand, is found to be significantly and 
positively correlated with our latent measures of institutional trust. Clans are in fact one of 
the pillars of Palestinian community governance. In the Territories, clans (hamail) are family-
based associations whose members do not necessarily need to be relatives. These associations 
usually group several extended families that might be connected through a common tribal 
father (Crisis Group 2007, Rothenberg 1998/1999; Atran 1986). One of the functions of clans 
is to provide protection to its members in exchange for obligations and loyalty (Landinfo, 
2008). Clans also contribute to the administration of justice. Along with the official court 
system, there is a traditional conflict resolution system based on a mediation committee 
whose members are chosen by clans. This system is more likely to be involved in cases of 
conflict where members of different clans are involved.  
Empirical evidence indicates significant and positive correlations between trust in clan and 
trust in public and international institutions. These positive correlations recall the role of 
community governance discussed by Bowels and Gintis (2002). They indicate with the term 
“community governance” a social organism or group able to provide a set of norms and rules 
facilitating the interaction of the members in a more cooperative manner (Bowels and Gintis, 
2002). One of the strengths of community governance is the access to private information not 
always available to public institutions. In this sense the community has greater access to the 
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monitoring of the behaviour of its members and it also has the capability to punish 
individuals who behave against the established social norms. On the basis of their 
experimental findings, Bowles and Gintis (2002) stress the fact that community governance 
cannot represent a substitute institutional framework of the State but a complementary 
organism that may contribute to governance where the public intitutions fail due to lack of 
information. This complementary synergy between community (clans) and public institutions 
is a crucial coping strategy for the institutional uncertainty represented by the Palestinian 
environment.  
 
4.1. Limitations of the study 
There are several reasons to treat these findings with caution. First, our indicator of prosocial 
attitudes is a latent variable obtained as a combination of a number of subjective measures 
that could have been unreliably reported by interviewees. Measures of trust are also given by 
subjective evaluations and thus exposed to common bias.  
The cross-sectional design of the study is another limitation which requires caution in 
advancing a causal interpretation of the estimates. More generally, the nature of the 
phenomena under discussion exposes the analysis to endogeneity problems in two ways.  
Firstly, institutional and knowledge-based trust are subjective and cognitive phenomena, 
which depend on individual, specific and unobservable preferences and perceptions. Hence, 
they are by definition endogenously determined. Unobservable, individual characteristics 
such as personal interests and values or unexpected shocks may be correlated with both 
prosocial attitudes and trust. Secondly, the possibility of a reverse causality could also be 
taken into account, in that individuals who have a preference for prosocial behaviour may be 
more willing to trust institutions. However, our estimates show that accounting for reverse 
causality markedly worsens the model’s goodness of fit.  
Our attempt to cope with endogeneity problems relies fundamentally on the use of SEM. 
Goldberger defines an SEM as “A stochastic model where each equation represents a causal 
linkage, rather than a simple empirical association” (Goldberger 1972, p. 979). SEMs are 
composed of regression equations, which are included in the model only so far as it is 
possible to interpret them as causal relationships, theoretically justifiable and not falsified by 
data (Garson 2011). However, it must be noted that, as other unexamined models may fit the 
data, if not better, an accepted model should be considered only as a ‘‘not-disconfirmed’’ 
model. Thus, even if the use of SEM allows us to more reliably evaluate the relationship 
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between trust and prosocial behaviour, the problem of causality still remains open to 
question, and causal ambiguities remain unsolved.  
In addition, our dataset does not allow us to control for relevant economic aspects such as 
income and wealth. 
A more reliable investigation into the determinants of prosocial behaviour in the Territories 
requires the collection of a more comprehensive and longitudinal dataset, observing the 
evolution of trust and prosocial behaviour over a prolonged period of time.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Despite the weaknesses outlined above, our paper adds to the literature by using a unique 
dataset to provide the first empirical investigation into the determinants of prosocial 
behaviour in a specific yet extremely interesting case such as the Palestinian Territories.  
Based on an SEM analysis articulated  in two steps – a measurement model and a pathway 
model – our results support the hypothesis that diverse types of trust may exert a different 
influence on prosocial behaviour depending on the institutional context and on the 
characteristics of the social fabric. Trust in public institutions is found to be significantly and 
positively correlated with prosocial behaviour, and its role seems to be markedly greater than 
that of knowledge-based trust, which is of only minor significance. Prosociality does not 
show any statistically significant relationship with trust in international organizations, despite 
their prominent role in the Territories’ economy. At this stage of the Palestinian process of 
state capacity building, domestic institutions apparently play a greater role than international 
organizations in fostering the diffusion of cooperative behaviours.   
We propose two explanations of these results. First, people who trust public institutions may 
be more confident that others will behave cooperatively, because they believe in the 
institutions’ ability to enforce rules and to identify and punish cheaters. On the other hand, 
citizens who perceive public institutions as efficient and fair may feel the moral obligation to 
behave prosocially as part of a “psychological contract” which ties them to the state. The 
significant and positive correlation of trust in clans with both prosocial attitudes and 
institutional trust also suggest important implications for policy makers and researchers in 
two interconnected points of reflection. Firstly, in modernizating the Palestinian society, the 
strengthening of public institutions, and the cooperation with international organizations 
(whether UN-connected or not), the role of the local community needs to be considered. This 
might lead to the second point of reflection: a process of state capacity building needs the 
support of the local community, especially where community institutions are perceived as 
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trustworthy and hold the power to enforce law across their members. Public institutions that 
recognise this role are more likely to gain the trust of their citizens and this can consolidate 
even more the establishment of the psychological contract. 
 Our findings also suggest that, in collectivist societies with low levels of generalized trust, 
the lack of citizens’ confidence in the fairness and efficiency of public institutions may 
compromise social order. On the other hand, the strengthening of institutional trust may 
reinforce prosocial behaviour in individualist societies, where a decline in generalized trust 
has been documented by empirical studies 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1 Correlation matrix of behavioural items  
 work bribe abstention  traffic stolen 
work 1.000     
bribe .235 1.000    
abstention .234 .134 1.000   
traffic .335 .224 .283 1.000  
stolen .168 .286 .242 .356 1.000 
All the correlations have a p-value < 0.01 
 
Table A2 Regression Weights (Measurement model prosocial behaviour) 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
stolen <--- Prosocial 1.000     
traffic <--- Prosocial .993 .073 13.649 *** par_1 
abstention <--- Prosocial 1.273 .110 11.619 *** par_2 
bribe <--- Prosocial .409 .032 12.876 *** par_3 
work <--- Prosocial 1.250 .089 14.043 *** par_4 
   *** 1% significance level  
 
 
Table A3 Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
work   .345 
bribe   .111 
abstention   .178 
traffic   .290 
stolen   .360 
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Table A4 Model Fit Indicators  
Indicator CIMN/DF RMSEA GFI AGFI NFI CFI 
Level in 
this 
analysis 
3.67 0.038 0.997 0.988 0.969 0.977 
Minimum 
Threshold 
level  
 
5< 
 
0.08< 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
       
 
 
 
Table A5 Correlation Matrix of the Trust Items in Public Institutions 
 Trust gov Trust 
parties 
Trust 
localgov 
Trust 
parliam 
Trust 
president 
Trust 
judicial 
Trust 
police 
Trust gov 1.000       
Trust 
parties 
.552 1.000      
Trust 
localgov 
.403 .427 1.000     
Trust 
parliam 
.669 .504 .495 1.000    
Trust 
president 
.335 .461 .332 .401 1.000   
Trust 
judicial 
.328 .344 .417 .430 .536 1.000  
Trust 
police 
.314 .398 .344 .352 .522 .501 1.000 
All the correlations have a p-value < 0.01 
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Table A6 Regression Weights – Trust in Institutions 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
trust_judicial <--- Trust Public_Institutions 1.286 .087 14.699 *** par_1 
trust_president <--- Trust Public_Institutions 1.431 .094 15.166 *** par_2 
trust_parliament <--- Trust Public_Institutions .982 .064 15.404 *** par_3 
trust_localgov <--- Trust Public_Institutions 1.000     
trust_parties <--- Trust Public_Institutions 1.096 .066 16.592 *** par_4 
trust_gov <--- Trust Public_Institutions .858 .064 13.426 *** par_5 
trust_police <--- Trust Public_Institutions 1.202 .082 14.578 *** par_6 
trust_donors <--- Trust International_Institutions 1.000     
trust_intorganisation <--- Trust International_Institutions .989 .033 29.633 *** par_7 
trust_un <--- Trust International_Institutions .969 .033 28.973 *** par_8 
 
 
Table A7 Model Fit Indicators  
Indicator CIMN/DF RMSEA GFI AGFI NFI CFI 
Level in 
this 
analysis 
3.32 0.04 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.94 
Minimum 
Threshold 
level  
 
5< 
 
0.08< 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
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Table A8 Squared Multiple Correlations (trust in public and international institutions) 
   Estimate 
trust_un   .669 
trust_intorganisation   .750 
trust_donors   .674 
trust_police   .457 
trust_gov   .219 
trust_parties   .414 
trust_localgov   .352 
trust_parliament   .291 
trust_president   .589 
trust_judicial   .510 
 
Table A9 Standardized Regression Weights (measurement model of trust in public and 
international institutions)   
   Estimate 
trust_judicial <--- Trust Public_Institutions .714 
trust_president <--- Trust Public _Institutions .768 
trust_parliament <--- Trust Public _Institutions .539 
trust_localgov <--- Trust Public_Institutions .593 
trust_parties <--- Trust Public _Institutions .643 
trust_gov <--- Trust Public_Institutions .467 
trust_police <--- Trust Public_Institutions .676 
trust_donors <--- Trust International_Institutions .821 
trust_intorganisation <--- Trust International_Institutions .866 
trust_un <--- Trust International_Institutions .818 
 
